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Current theories in the framework of hierarchical predictive coding propose that positive
symptoms of schizophrenia, such as delusions and hallucinations, arise from an
alteration in Bayesian inference, the term inference referring to a process by which
learned predictions are used to infer probable causes of sensory data. However, for
one particularly striking and frequent symptom of schizophrenia, thought insertion, no
plausible account has been proposed in terms of the predictive-coding framework. Here
we propose that thought insertion is due to an altered experience of thoughts as coming
from “nowhere”, as is already indicated by the early 20th century phenomenological
accounts by the early Heidelberg School of psychiatry. These accounts identified
thought insertion as one of the self-disturbances (from German: “Ichstörungen”) of
schizophrenia and used mescaline as a model-psychosis in healthy individuals to
explore the possible mechanisms. The early Heidelberg School (Gruhle, Mayer-Gross,
Beringer) first named and defined the self-disturbances, and proposed that thought
insertion involves a disruption of the inner connectedness of thoughts and experiences,
and a “becoming sensory” of those thoughts experienced as inserted. This account
offers a novel way to integrate the phenomenology of thought insertion with the
predictive coding framework. We argue that the altered experience of thoughts may be
caused by a reduced precision of context-dependent predictions, relative to sensory
precision. According to the principles of Bayesian inference, this reduced precision
leads to increased prediction-error signals evoked by the neural activity that encodes
thoughts. Thus, in analogy with the prediction-error related aberrant salience of
external events that has been proposed previously, “internal” events such as thoughts
(including volitions, emotions and memories) can also be associated with increased
prediction-error signaling and are thus imbued with aberrant salience. We suggest that
the individual’s attempt to explain the aberrant salience of thoughts results in their
interpretation as being inserted by an alien agent, similarly to the emergence of delusions
in response to the aberrant salience of sensory stimuli.
Keywords: self-disorders, first rank symptoms, schizophrenia, phenomenological psychiatry, Bayesian inference,
predictive coding, Mayer-Gross, mescaline
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HIERARCHICAL PREDICTIVE CODING
AND THE POSITIVE SYMPTOMS OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Schizophrenia is typically characterized by a range of clinical
features that comprise so-called positive symptoms such as
delusions, hallucinations and self-disturbances, and negative
symptoms such as reduced volition and affect expression. Current
neurocognitive and computational theories propose that the
positive symptoms of schizophrenia are due to an abnormality
in the brain’s inference mechanisms (Corlett et al., 2009;
Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Adams et al., 2013). Originating from
Helmholtz’ idea of unconscious inference (Von Helmholtz,
1867), these theories conceptualize the brain as an inference
machine that uses a predictive model to infer the (hidden)
causes of the incoming sensory data (Dayan et al., 1995). This
idea has been formalized in the framework of hierarchical
predictive coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee and Mumford,
2003; Friston, 2005; Clark, 2013). The main idea is that a
predictive model that represents knowledge and beliefs about
the world serves to generate a stable and unitary perceptual
experience from the inherently impoverished data registered
by our senses. These predictions can be based in principle
on any source of information other than the actual sensory
stimulus that is subject to inference, that is, the stimulus
whose cause is to be inferred. Predictions involve learned
knowledge about the world as well as information from
immediately preceding or concomitant events, i.e., contextual
information (Clark, 2013; Phillips et al., 2015). Please note
that we here use the term ‘‘context’’ in a broad sense as
previously defined by Phillips et al. (2015), that is, referring to a
wide range of phenomena that implicate predictive processing,
such as contextual disambiguation, attentional processes, and
learning. Predictive signals are thought to be fed back from
higher to lower levels of cortical hierarchies. Whenever
predictions are violated by sensory data, a prediction error
signal is fed forward to the next higher hierarchical level to
update the predictive model. Prediction errors thereby drive
learning and enable a flexible adaptation to changes in the
environment.
Computational approaches have conceptualized hierarchical
predictive coding as Bayesian inference (Lee andMumford, 2003;
Friston, 2005). The underlying principle of Bayesian inference is
that the probability of a prediction, which is commonly referred
to as prior belief, is combined with the observed sensory data
to compute a posterior probability. The difference between the
means of the probability density functions of the prior belief and
the sensory data corresponds to prediction error. Importantly,
the size of the prediction error is weighted by the precisions
of the prior belief and the sensory data: if the precision (which
corresponds to the inverse of the width of the probability density
function) of the sensory data is high relative to the precision of
the prior belief, the precision-weighted prediction error will be
greater and vice versa. It has been proposed that the psychosis
is linked to decreased precision in the representation of prior
beliefs relative to an increased precision in the encoding of the
sensory data, which results in an abnormally strong weighting of
precision error (Adams et al., 2013; Adams and Friston, in press);
this can lead to the attribution of salience to otherwise irrelevant
stimuli thus giving rise to delusional mood and the subsequent
formation of delusions. This link between salience misattribution
(or aberrant salience) and the formation of delusions was noted
earlier by a number of authors, with or without direct reference
to prediction error signaling as the underlying mechanism
(Conrad, 1958; Heinz, 2002; Kapur, 2003; Corlett et al., 2009;
Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Mishara and Corlett, 2009; Heinz and
Schlagenhauf, 2010; Mishara, 2010b; Mishara and Fusar-Poli,
2013).
This predictive-coding account of altered inference has
been related to the emergence of delusions of reference or
persecution, and to a lesser extent delusions of control and
hallucinations (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Adams et al., 2013;
Notredame et al., 2014), but not specifically to a group of positive
symptoms that are commonly classified as self-disturbances
(from the German ‘‘Ichstörungen’’). In the present article, we
propose an account within the predictive-coding framework of
a particularly striking and frequently reported form of self-
disturbance, the experience of one’s thoughts as being caused
by somebody else, which is commonly referred to as thought
insertion. In brief, we take our lead from the early Heidelberg
School of phenomenological psychiatry and suggest that thought
insertion is a form of aberrant or false inference, in analogy
to the perceptual domain. Crucially, we will argue that the
phenomenon of thought insertion entails a failure of hierarchical
Bayesian inference to contextualize or predict the narrative
interconnectedness of thoughts. In other words, there is an
imprecise representation of context and a subsequent failure
to provide top-down predictions of the neural representations
of thoughts. These representations are therefore experienced as
being caused by external forces, much in the same way that
percepts are experienced as being caused by sensory input. It is
this experience of thoughts as sensations that characterizes, as
we indicate, thought insertion as a self-disturbance, in line with
the phenomenological accounts of the early Heidelberg School.
We will propose that the neurocomputational mechanism
underlying this form of false inference is a reduction in the
precision of prior beliefs relative to the precision in the encoding
of thoughts, thus leading to increased prediction error and thus
aberrant salience of thoughts. This account of thought insertion
fits comfortably with explanations for delusions that are seen
as a consequence of the aberrant salience of external stimuli, as
outlined above.
THOUGHT INSERTION AND THE
COMPARATOR MODEL: CAN WE TREAT
THOUGHTS LIKE ACTIONS?
The self-disturbances feature prominently among the first-rank
symptoms proposed by Kurt Schneider. He described the self-
disturbances as ‘‘certain disturbances in the experience of self
that are highly specific for schizophrenia. . .[They] consist in the
feeling that what one is and does is under the direct influence
of others. . .[and] are found in the influencing of thought,
feeling, impulse (drive) and will’’ (Schneider, 1946); modified
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English translation from Schneider (1959). Cutting (2015)
observes that seven out of Schneider’s 11 first-rank symptoms,
including thought insertion, are self-disturbances. Moreover, the
remaining four are arguably related if we take the historical
definition of the self-disturbances into account: ‘‘passivity—the
nonparticipation in one’s own experience’’, whereby one’s
actions, cognitions, emotions, volitions, etc., are experienced
as ‘‘occurring independently from self’’ (Schneider, 1959). As
indicated in the subsequent section, the origin and history of
the self-disturbances concept, however, beginning some 30 years
prior to Kurt Schneider’s proposal of the first-rank symptoms,
has remained nearly completely unexplored until only recently.
As a result, commentators have almost universally propagated
the assumptions that the self-disturbances are characterized
by a ‘‘loss of a sense of mineness’’, or ‘‘ipseity’’, and that
such self-disturbances are ‘‘core to schizophrenia’’ (Sass and
Parnas, 2003; Zahavi, 2005; for reviews see Mishara, 2007, 2010a;
Mishara et al., 2014). The actual originators and developers of
the concept (namely, the earlier Heidelberg School as reviewed
below) did not endorse either assumption. The lack of clarity
concerning the history, concept and phenomenology of the
self-disturbances has impeded the search for neurobiological
mechanisms, which we attempt to correct in the current
contribution. In this article, we focus on thought insertion, which
refers to the experience of one’s own thoughts as caused by an
alien agent.
The reasons for our interest in thought insertion are twofold.
First, thought insertion is not only one of the most striking of
the positive symptoms, but also a very frequent one occurring in
approximately half of all patients diagnosed with schizophrenia
(Sartorius et al., 1977) while absent in organic psychoses, e.g.,
those induced by tonic dopaminergic stimulation in Parkinson’s
patients (Heinz et al., 1995). Second, there has been a long-
standing debate regarding the relation of thought insertion to
other positive symptoms with respect to current neurocognitive
models and it has recently been questioned whether a Bayesian
approach is able to provide a plausible account of thought
insertion at all (Frith, 2012). Partially in response to the criticism
(summarized below) that thoughts are not a kind of action,
Frith abandons his earlier position that ‘‘the ‘made experiences’
including delusions of alien control and thought insertion, are
associated with abnormalities in the mechanism that predicts
the outcome of intended actions (the forward model)’’ (Frith,
2005). He (Frith, 2012) concedes: ‘‘a general, Bayesian approach
does not provide a plausible account for the most striking of
all first rank symptoms, thought insertion. This is ironic given
that it was to explain this symptom that the comparator theory
was first proposed’’. Here we would like to argue that the
previous problems in providing plausible accounts of thought
insertion stem largely from the attempt to draw an analogy
with delusions of control, in which not the thoughts but one’s
own actions are experienced as being caused and controlled
by an external agent. That is, we contend that it is possible
to develop a Bayesian account of thought insertion without
resorting to the analogy between thought and action. We
do so precisely by relying on the earlier phenomenological
work.
Delusions of control have long been proposed to result from
a failure to predict one’s own actions due to impairment in
generating ‘‘corollary discharge’’ signals (also called efference
copy) that normally serve to attenuate the sensory consequences
of self-initiated actions. The classic comparator model (Frith
and Done, 1989) suggested that if the predicted and observed
sensory consequences do not match, an action is experienced
as generated by somebody else. This model can be translated
into a Bayesian framework, in which corollary discharge would
be equivalent to signaling Bayesian prior beliefs (i.e., a forward
model of an action) and the sensory feedback signals correspond
to the sensory data. Thus, similar to the idea that delusions
of control result from a failure to attenuate the sensory
consequences of one’s own actions (Frith and Done, 1989), the
Bayesian account suggests a reduced precision in predicting
these sensory consequences, resulting in increased precision-
weighted prediction-error signals (Fletcher and Frith, 2009;
Adams et al., 2013; Synofzik et al., 2013). It was recently
noted, however, that even if the predicted and observed sensory
consequences do not match, they will be attenuated during
intended movements (Brown et al., 2013). Earlier accounts based
upon the comparator and forward models failed to distinguish
between the attenuation of precision during action and the
suppression of prediction error per se by correct predictions
or corollary discharge. This means that misattributions of
agency and illusory phenomena characteristic of psychosis
are better explained in terms of a failure to attenuate the
precision of ascending sensory prediction errors. This failure
of sensory attenuation can account for a resistance to illusions,
such as the well-known force matching illusion (Brown et al.,
2013).
In analogy with the comparator model, a mechanism on the
basis of altered corollary discharge signaling was also proposed
for thought insertion (Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992; Campbell,
1999), but this idea has been criticized for a number of reasons
(Stephens and Graham, 2000; Gallagher, 2004; Vosgerau and
Newen, 2007; Frith, 2012). Most critically, it has been questioned
whether thoughts can be treated like actions. One key problem
is that, in the case of motor acts, the comparator model
implicates intentions for movement. The comparator functions
to match the corollary discharge signal to the motor intentions,
thus anticipating the movement and its sensory consequences.
However, unlike actions, thoughts are not associated with
intentions.1 In fact, the idea of having an intention to think leads
to an infinite regress, whereby each thought would have to be
preceded by an intention to think and this intention to think
would also have to be preceded by an intention, and so on (Akins
and Dennett, 1986; Stephens and Graham, 2000; Heinz, 2014).
It has also been questioned whether a comparator mechanism
is needed at all in the case of thinking (Gallagher, 2004). It
1Conversely, beginning meditators who practice mindfulness anecdotally
report that the ‘‘intention’’ not to think brings little relief to the deluge
of thoughts that follow. This suggests that thinking is not easily guided
by ‘‘intention’’ in either producing thoughts or resisting them. Note that
‘‘thinking’’ here is not confined to the deliberate, effortful search which, for
example, accompanies such phenomena as the ‘‘tip of the tongue.’’
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is indeed implausible that the act of thinking should have
sensory consequences that need to be ‘‘explained away’’ by a
corollary discharge signal, as there is normally no need for
distinguishing self-initiated thoughts from thoughts that are not
self-initiated. Finally, the comparator model does not seem to
sufficiently explain why inserted thoughts are experienced as
being caused by another agent, whereas unbidden or intrusive
thoughts that run through our heads unexpectedly or even
against our will are not (Stephens and Graham, 2000; Gallagher,
2004; Vosgerau and Newen, 2007; Brewin et al., 2010; Heinz,
2014).
We concur with the previous critiques in that we do not
find the analogy between thoughts and actions particularly
helpful. Instead, we suggest that the flow, or continuity of
thinking relies much more on the automatic processing of
context—including previous thoughts—than we are usually
prone to admit or observe.2 In the next section we provide
a historical introduction to the concept of self-disturbances,
and in particular thought insertion, with an emphasis on
the early 20th century phenomenological accounts of these
symptoms. Interestingly, these phenomenological descriptions
highlighted thought insertion as a ‘‘perceptual experience’’. On
the basis of these observations, we then go on to develop
an account of thought insertion within the framework of
hierarchical predictive coding and Bayesian inference, which
suggests that the prediction errors may be more ‘‘low-
level’’ than current theories of thought insertion would
suggest.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THOUGHT
INSERTION
In the literature, the origin of the term self-disturbances
is frequently attributed to Jaspers (for review see Mishara
et al., 2014). Although Jaspers (1913) described phenomena
related to self-disturbances, such as passivity experiences,
being influenced, inserted or withdrawn thoughts, he did not
systemize them under the concept of self-disturbances. The
historical reviews then jump to Schneider’s systemization of the
self-disturbances in the 1940s, which are then included among
2By emphasizing agency and intention, the role of automaticity in thinking
has often been neglected. To take one example, which at least indirectly
suggests an automatic component, the philosopher Heidegger (1969, 1977)
claims that ‘‘thinking’’ is neither the product of the agency of an ‘‘I,’’ nor the
relationship of ownership to what is thought. Rather, thinking is a ‘‘letting
be’’ of the matter thought about, which, in turn, discloses itself, opens itself
to thought, as if thinking itself were a conversation, a dialog of question and
answer which is future oriented. The ‘‘opening sets us the task of learning
from it, while questioning it, that is, of letting it say something to us’’
(Heidegger, 1977). We do not enter here into Heidegger’s ontological and
philosophical goals, which are not critical to our argument. As the Heidelberg
psychiatrist, Gruhle (1922, 1929, 1932) notes, the ‘‘medium,’’ who, in a
state of ‘‘possession’’ imparts the thoughts of the spirit possessing her does
not experience thought insertion. The medium is conscious of her role as
medium, and even if the possession is against her will, it does not lead to
thought insertion. One may be ‘‘surprised’’ by one’s own thoughts and even
learn from them, but does not experience these thoughts as inserted because
they occur within a more or less expected context.
the first rank symptoms, thus omitting not only who coined
the term but nearly 30 years of its development. Only recently,
Mishara et al. (2015) documented for the first time (as far as
we know) the role of Jaspers’ Heidelberg colleagues (the early
Heidelberg School, i.e., Gruhle, Mayer-Gross, and Beringer)
in the origin and development of the self-disturbance concept
(see Hermle et al., 1988 for exception in their acknowledgment
of Beringer’s contribution). In fact, it was Gruhle (1915)
who coined the term self-disturbance: ‘‘Tentatively, I call this
passivity—the nonparticipation in one’s own experience—a
self-disturbance’’ (our translation). In coining the term,
Gruhle (1915, 1922, 1929) identified two components of
self-disturbances: a perceptual-component, whereby the
self looks passively on its own perceptual experiences as a
non-participatory bystander, in a doubling/splitting of the
I (Doppel-Ich), as if everything plays before the subject
on a theater-stage; and a higher-cognitive component,
implicating that thoughts, feelings, actions and volition
are experienced as coming under foreign power(s). Not
recognized as double(s), the foreign agents have power over the
self.
The further development of the concept of self-disturbances
was closely linked to a study by Heidelberg psychiatrists
Beringer and Mayer-Gross in the 1920’s, which used mescaline
to examine the phenomenology of psychotic experiences,
especially the self-disturbances, in healthy participants. The
participants included psychiatrists and medical students
with the goal of becoming more able to empathize with
or understand those experiences of psychotic patients that
Jaspers (1913) had labeled as non-understandable due to an
underlying as yet unknown neurobiological disease process,
which interrupts the development of the person. On the
basis of his experiences as a participant in the mescaline
studies, Mayer-Gross noted that thoughts are not ascribed
to alien agency, but that they are rather perceived as alien.
He described a ‘‘becoming sensory’’ (Versinnlichung) in the
‘‘sensory representation of thoughts. . .Without this change,
the manifestations remain inexplicable’’ (Mayer-Gross and
Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932). He further notes that we
obtain ‘‘insight into the progressive invasiveness of the thought-
disturbances from the earliest sign of difficulties in concentrating
[. . .]. These prodromal manifestations lead to a scattered
emptiness of thinking, quite similar to thought withdrawal’’
(our translation). In his careful phenomenological analysis
of subtle self-perceived cognitive and other disturbances in
prodromal schizophrenia and mescaline intoxication, Mayer-
Gross anticipated Huber’s basic-symptom concept (Huber, 1995;
Mishara et al., 2015).
As far as we know, Mayer-Gross’ novel hypothesis that
thought insertion involves a ‘‘becoming sensory’’ of individual,
intermittent thoughts has not been previously discussed in
the secondary literature on thought insertion or other self-
disturbances. It also seems to have escaped the attention of
commentators that Mayer-Gross is the herald of what later
came to be known as the ‘‘perceptual anomalies’’ approach to
the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, the view that low-level
perceptual anomalies play a critical role in the positive symptoms
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of schizophrenia, including thought insertion and other self-
disturbances. The phenomenological psychiatrists Matussek,
Conrad and Binswanger later developed this view (for reviews see
Uhlhaas and Mishara, 2007; Mishara, 2010b; Mishara and Fusar-
Poli, 2013). Later, others came to similar conclusions (Maher,
1974; Frith, 1979; Gray et al., 1991).
The observations from Beringer’s and Mayer-Gross’
mescaline experiments supported Gruhle’s earlier observations
concerning the self-disturbances on several points. First, they
supported Gruhle’s (1915, 1922, 1929, 1932) proposal that
perceptions, movements, hallucinatory experiences, feelings,
volitions, remembering, speaking and thinking are experienced
in the self-disturbances as having ‘‘independence from self’’
(Beringer, 1927). Generally, we experience controlled and
automatic processing working together seamlessly in everyday
cognition, without giving much thought to how this takes place.
In self-disturbances, however, the patient experiences these
underlying automatic processes as independent ‘‘automatisms’’
having foreign origin.
Second, Beringer and Mayer-Gross concur with Gruhle’s
argument that thought insertion and other self-disturbances are
non-understandable in Jaspers (1913) sense, as they cannot be
derived from previous content or understandable motivation in
the patient’s personality. Gruhle observed that inserted thoughts
often concern harmless, mundane circumstances. Despite an
absence of obvious difference in content from other thoughts, the
patient knows precisely which thoughts are inserted. Recently,
we (PS, ALM) interviewed a schizophrenia patient who describes
inserted thoughts, in line with Gruhle’s observation, as not
particularly unusual in content. For example, the patient ascribes
his (perfectly mundane) thought to go to the supermarket and
buy bananas to someone else thinking the thought, because he
cannot derive it from the current context of his thinking: ‘‘It
seems that someone else is in the supermarket and thinks, ‘I
will now buy bananas’. Then I have this thought in my head,
although I was not thinking about the supermarket. [. . .] What
is disturbing is not the content, but the constant interruption of
my thinking.’’
Third, Gruhle, Beringer and Mayer-Gross agree that self-
disturbances (Ichstörungen) generally involve the interruption of
understandable context which requires an inner connectedness
of experience. This includes how thinking is anticipated
moment-to-moment as continuous. Beringer writes, ‘‘In
healthy individuals there is the always unconscious heading
towards a totality, an intuitive knowing where the thought is
going, which is missing in thought-disturbances’’ (Beringer,
1924). Seeming to come from ‘‘nowhere’’, [Gruhle’s phrasing]
inserted thoughts disrupt the on-line contribution from just
past thoughts in shaping the inner continuity and goal-
directedness of thinking (Gruhle, 1922, 1929). Due to the
ongoing interruption by inserted thoughts and ‘‘made’’
perceptions or movements, there is a reduction of what the
patient anticipates (‘‘das Vorschauende’’); there is only the
compelling sensory-evidence of now: ‘‘No temporal order
prevails, each sensory impression is equally valued, replacing
its predecessor’’ (our translation; Mayer-Gross and Stein,
1928).
Finally, Gruhle (1922, 1929, 1932) and Mayer-Gross (1932)
agree that the self-disturbances should be counted among the
‘‘primary symptoms’’ of schizophrenia (in Jaspers, 1913 sense).
That is, the primary symptoms may co-occur but are independent
(orthogonal) and are not specific, nor core to schizophrenia.
Despite points of agreement, Mayer-Gross and Gruhle
disagree on the role of low-level sensory processing in generating
thought insertion and other self-disturbances. Gruhle concludes
that the underlying perception remains intact. He reasons
that if one listens to patients who state that something is
conspicuous or salient in their perceptual environment, even
the most articulate patients are unable to say precisely what
they actually find striking. Mayer-Gross counters that such
arguments are not based on phenomenological evidence but
rather on an absence of evidence, from which one cannot
draw conclusions. For Mayer-Gross (Mayer-Gross and Stein,
1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932), the clinical interview is key in
ascertaining the phenomenological data by freeing ourselves
‘‘from theoretical prejudices and the need to derive everything
from the content of these experiences’’ (our translation), i.e.,
the ‘‘what’’ as opposed to the ‘‘how’’ of these experiences (see
immediately below). The early Heidelberg School’s views on
thought insertion were developed on the basis of Jaspers (1913)
method of attempting—during clinical interview—to understand
or empathize with the patient by reconstructing from moment
to moment the inner, subjective connectedness of patients’
experience and thoughts. We note that the phenomenological
definition of thought insertion and the self-disturbances as
loss of context (here the interconnectedness of thoughts in
subjective time) dovetails nicely with the predictive coding
approach (see Giersch and Mishara, in press). Thought insertion
involves a disruption in the patient’s on-line continuity of
thinking that impedes the interviewing clinician’s empathic
understanding or reconstruction of context in Jaspers’ sense (for
Jaspers’ method, see Mishara and Fusar-Poli, 2013). For Mayer-
Gross, the mescaline experiments were critical in that they
‘‘opened the way to explaining these non-empathizable forms
of subjective experience, which, up till now, have occasioned
very unsatisfactory efforts to interpret or theoretically understand
these experiences’’ (our translation; Mayer-Gross and Stein,
1926).
In his assertion that thought insertion is thinking ‘‘becoming
sensory’’, Mayer-Gross not only contends with Heidelberg
colleague, Gruhle, but also encounters opposing views in
his contemporary, Leipzig-based psychiatrist, Paul Schröder.
For his theory of thought insertion, Schröder leans heavily
on the celebrated neuropsychiatrist Wernicke. Both Wernicke
(1906) and Schröder (1915, 1921a,b, 1926, 1928) argue that
thoughts becoming loud (Gedankenlautwerden), auditory verbal
hallucinations, thought insertion and ‘‘the made thoughts and
experiences’’ (Wernicke’s autochthonous ideas) are not based
on a perceptual disturbance but strictly on a verbal-linguistic
one (i.e., ‘‘phonemes’’). For this reason, Schröder proposes that
all these symptoms are related in content and may transition
from one to the other during the course of the illness in
schizophrenia. He finds thought insertion is often the precursor
in the course of illness to thoughts becoming loud and auditory
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verbal hallucinations. Schröder concludes that thought insertion,
thoughts becoming loud and auditory verbal hallucinations are
related symptoms and groups them under the unitary concept
‘‘verbal hallucinosis’’.
Despite the emphasis on phonemes, he proposes that the
critical element in this symptom-complex is a ‘‘feeling of
foreignness’’ (Fremdheitsgefühl). He regards the ‘‘feeling of
foreignness’’ as primary, a not further analyzable or explainable
original phenomenon. Its imposition on the phonemes gives
them their foreign character, an ‘‘externalizing’’ of thoughts. The
patient often thinks that the made or influenced thoughts are
caused by hypnosis, suggestion, etc., i.e., delusional explanations
(Erklärungswahn). However, each of these symptoms result
from ‘‘transitions’’ and variations in the fundamental ‘‘feeling
of foreignness’’. Progressing from thought insertion to thoughts
becoming loud and auditory verbal hallucinations, they involve
‘‘a co-speaking, a speaking before, a speaking after, a repeating,
or an answering back’’ (Schröder, 1928).
Mayer-Gross (Mayer-Gross and Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross,
1932) counters that Schröder’s ‘‘feeling of foreignness’’
(Fremdheitsgefühl) as the not further analyzable original
phenomenon of verbal hallucinosis is theoretical and thus,
arbitrary, i.e., not based on phenomenological method or
data. He comments: ‘‘To this day we know nothing of the
inner interconnectedness of these symptoms and claims
about their essence are presumptuous. Rather, by sticking
faithfully to patients’ reports of subjective experience, we
consistently find descriptions which clearly go back to the
sensory sources. . .the perceptual anomalies in beginning
schizophrenia’’ (Mayer-Gross, 1932). According to Mayer-
Gross, what makes the inserted thought stand out from other
thoughts is not a ‘‘feeling of foreignness,’’ but rather the
experience of individual thoughts becoming sensory. This involves
a transformed sense of what is experienced as perceptual
according to a ‘‘functional transformation’’ (Mayer-Gross and
Stein, 1928; Beringer and Ruffin, 1932; Weizsäcker, 1950). That
is, the way that the perception is given is radically altered,
and is ‘‘incomparable’’ to previous perceptual experiences
(Mayer-Gross and Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932). Importantly,
what makes thought insertion and other self-disturbances
aberrantly salient is not the content of the thoughts, volitions,
etc., but the manner of their givenness, not the ‘‘what’’ but the
‘‘how’’ of the experience. Thus patients do not infer that their
thoughts, hallucinations, etc., are caused by foreign agency
from the content but from how they are given, as radically
altered, ‘‘incomparable’’ to previous cognitive and perceptual
experiences. It is likely that Mayer-Gross developed this
approach not only from the acuity of his clinical observations,
but from his own insights directly resulting from his mescaline
experience.
Counter to Schröder’s thesis of a successive progression of
related symptoms from thought insertion to thoughts becoming
loud and then, auditory verbal hallucinations, Mayer-Gross
observes in some patients the nearly simultaneous experience
of akoasm (nonverbal auditory hallucinations, e.g., buzzing,
whistling, roaring), auditory verbal hallucinations, and thought
insertion. Importantly, they are not interpreted as belonging
to one symptom complex (as Schröder’s ‘‘verbal hallucinosis’’),
but orthogonal occurrences which nevertheless may involve
similar neural mechanisms. The voices and akoasms ‘‘surprise’’
and thought insertion ‘‘interrupts’’, but they all involve the
disruption of context according to a ‘‘functional change’’ of the
lower-level sensory basis of these disturbances, which cannot
be surmised by a generalized ‘‘feeling of foreignness’’ (Mayer-
Gross and Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932). The latter is merely
a change in content (‘‘what’’) but not ‘‘how’’, the modality
in which the experience is given.3 The parallel occurrences of
these symptoms indicate different levels of disruption of the
Gestalt organization of the experience, a point later developed
byMatussek (1952, 1953), Conrad (1958) and Binswanger (1965)
(for reviews see Uhlhaas and Mishara, 2007; Mishara, 2010b,
2011).
THOUGHT INSERTION AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF REDUCED
PRECISION OF PRIOR BELIEFS
A central aspect of the phenomenological accounts of self-
disturbances is that an altered experience of thoughts is at the
core of thought insertion as a self-disturbance. Because inserted
thoughts are perceived as especially surprising and hence not
in continuity with previous thoughts, they are experienced as
coming from ‘‘nowhere’’ and interpreted as being inserted by
somebody else. Here we propose that, in analogy with the
aberrant salience of external events that leads to the emergence
of delusional beliefs (Heinz, 2002; Kapur, 2003; Corlett et al.,
2009; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Heinz and Schlagenhauf, 2010;
Mishara and Fusar-Poli, 2013), internal events such as thoughts
may also be experienced as overly salient and therefore unusual
and surprising. The individual’s attempt to explain the aberrant
salience and unusual character of thoughts (what Mayer-Gross
identifies as ‘‘how’’ they are given) results in their interpretation
as being caused by an alien agent. To provide a plausible account
of thought insertion within the framework of hierarchical
predictive coding, two key questions need to be addressed. In
the first place, how can the aberrant salience of thoughts be
accounted for by altered Bayesian inference? And in the second
3It is important to note that in his application of phenomenological
method,Mayer-Gross not only countered Schröder’s ‘‘feeling of foreignness’’,
but also psychoanalytic approaches at the time which based their
theoretical explanations on content. On first glance, it would seem
that Mayer-Gross’ novel hypothesis of thoughts becoming sensory in
thought insertion resembles Freud’s own account of words (thoughts)
becoming replaced by symbolic images in dreams, hypnagogic images
or psychosis as a kind of rebus (or puzzle), i.e., what Freud calls a
‘‘topographical regression’’ from word-presentations (Wortvorstellungen) to
thing-presentations (Dingvorstellungen). In both the phenomenological and
psychoanalytic accounts, thoughts start to behave like perceptual objects.
However, the phenomenology of thought insertion (and its implicated
mechanism) is not based on content (which can be understandably
derived from the patient’s past personality, motivations, unconscious wishes,
Weltanschauung, etc., as in psychoanalysis), but rather on its ‘‘mode of
givenness’’, not its ‘‘what’’, but its ‘‘how’’. That is, the patient is able to identify
which thoughts are inserted not in terms of their content, which may not be
unusual, but rather how they are given (i.e., experienced as sensory objects).
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place, if aberrant salience is at the core of thought insertion,
why should it result in the experience of thoughts as being
caused by an external agent? We address these two questions in
turn.
Reduced Precision of Prior Beliefs and
Decontextualization
With regard to the first question, we propose that the
mechanism underlying aberrant salience of thoughts is reduced
precision of prior beliefs about these very thoughts. As
discussed previously by Martin and Pacherie (2013), thoughts
are normally experienced as our own thoughts because they
are embedded in a context. As they put it, we experience
our thoughts as our own because of ‘‘online dynamical
processes of causal–contextual information integration’’. This
contextual information comprises external stimuli (‘‘I’m thinking
about Ada because I just saw her photo’’) or preceding
thoughts (‘‘I’m thinking of Ada because I just thought of
her sister Cosima’’), but also explicit or implicit beliefs,
emotions, desires and interests (Campbell, 1999; Stephens
and Graham, 2000; Martin and Pacherie, 2013). In terms
of predictive coding, such contextual information is the
source of prior beliefs (or predictions) about upcoming
thoughts. Importantly, we propose here that this predictive
context need not be conscious: I may think about Ada
without knowing why, but it does not bother me because
the context is still present unconsciously. This is consistent
with phenomenological accounts of unconscious automatic
processing providing context to expect what comes next (Gruhle,
1922, 1929). The failure to integrate contextual information
results in a ‘‘decontextualization’’, (what the phenomenological
psychiatrist Blankenburg called a ‘‘context blindness’’ or a loss of
common sense; Blankenburg, 1984; Blankenburg and Mishara,
2001) which in turnmay lead to an altered experience of thoughts
as surprising and as a consequence, their attribution to an alien
agent.
The failure to integrate contextual information such as
reference to a preceding thought could also be linked to
symptoms such as loose word associations, incoherent speech
and deficits in abstract thinking that characterize formal thought
disorder in schizophrenia. As a result of loosened associations,
several studies show alterations in tests of word association (for a
review see Spitzer, 1992) or semantic priming (e.g., Moritz et al.,
2003). In such tasks, unconscious automatic spread of activation
within semantic memory in schizophrenia patients is increased
and farther-reaching than in healthy individuals, resulting in
co-activations of semantically related concepts, which in turn
affects goal-directed thinking. One could speculate that such
abnormal associative processes are involved in the occurrence
of inserted thoughts in schizophrenia: arbitrary stimuli might
trigger an association chain that goes far beyond the normal
scope. The resulting thoughts may be experienced as coming
from nowhere, since the trigger cannot be traced back anymore,
even implicitly, as non-conscious context. In order to explain
the unusual experience, the individual may form a delusional
explanation for the occurrence of the untraceable thought.
The notion of disrupted context integration is supported
by a large body of experimental evidence for altered context
processing in patients with schizophrenia. For example,
psychophysical studies investigating visual illusions showed
that the influence of spatial context in the perception of
visual stimuli is reduced in patients with schizophrenia. The
perceived contrast of a central stimulus is normally reduced
when embedded in a high contrast surround, a phenomenon
called surround suppression (Chubb et al., 1989). Patients
with schizophrenia are less susceptible to this effect: under
conditions that induce such surround suppression in healthy
individuals, patients with schizophrenia have a more veridical
perception of the center contrast than controls (Dakin et al.,
2005; Yoon et al., 2009, 2010; Barch et al., 2012; Gold et al.,
2012; Tibber et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013) and show a
reduced modulation of neural responses already at the lowest
stages of cortical visual processing (Seymour et al., 2013).
Reduced context effects were also reported for motion and
size perception (Uhlhaas et al., 2004; Tadin et al., 2006;
Uhlhaas et al., 2006). It should be noted, however, that release
from contextual suppression in schizophrenia patients is
not uniformly found for all visual context effects (Tibber
et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013) and that there is only limited
evidence for correlation with symptom severity. The latter
point may be due to relatively small sample sizes in some
of these studies (Tibber et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013) or to
samples of relatively stable patients with a limited range of
psychotic symptoms (Gold et al., 2012). Alternatively, the lack
of correlation may point to reduced context effects as a trait
rather than a state marker of psychosis, as discussed earlier
(Seymour et al., 2013). To our knowledge, none of these studies
specifically investigated the relationship between altered visual
context processing and thought insertion. Similar to spatial
context, effects of temporal context on visual perception are
also reduced in patients with schizophrenia, as indicated by
a reduced influence of preceding perceptual states on the
current perception of ambiguous visual stimuli (Schmack et al.,
2015). Interestingly, this latter finding was found to correlate
with the severity of delusions (Schmack et al., 2015) and with
delusion-proneness in healthy individuals (Schmack et al.,
2013). Again, whether such temporal context effects are also
related to thought insertion remains to be investigated. These
perceptual phenomena are characterized by a high degree of
automaticity and resistance to cognitive influence, which is
why they are thought to be implemented at low levels of the
visual processing hierarchy, i.e., within sensory cortices. The
altered perception of visual illusions and ambiguous stimuli
in schizophrenia thus suggest a functional abnormality at
low hierarchical levels, thus pointing to a pervasive deficit
that involves predictive processing throughout all levels of
the predictive coding hierarchy. This idea is in line with
observations by various phenomenologists (including Mayer-
Gross, Binswanger and Conrad), who concluded that the
anomalies enter at a very early stage of sensory processing. In
addition to these findings in the domain of perception, there are
also examples of altered learning in patients with schizophrenia.
One such example is latent inhibition, a phenomenon whereby
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a stimulus that has been presented repeatedly, but has not had
any predictive value is difficult to associate with an outcome at
a later stage. In other words, the context of previous stimulus
exposures (in which no predictive value was associated)
influences inference with regard to this stimulus later in time
(Fletcher and Frith, 2009). In individuals with schizophrenia,
latent inhibition is reduced, that is, they learn to associate
stimuli to which they have been previously exposed with
a predictive value more easily than healthy controls (Vaitl
et al., 2002). Another example of reduced context effects in
learning is the observation that in people with schizophrenia
the recall of extinction learning following fear conditioning
is impaired, with a reduced effect of the context that was
learned during extinction on conditioned responses (Holt et al.,
2009).
In contrast to the special case of visual illusions, a deficit
in context integration will not alter the actual content of
conscious perception in everyday vision, but may nevertheless
result in the aberrant salience of sensory stimuli. Similarly to
the processing of external sensory events, a context integration
deficit may also play a role in the process of thinking (Martin
and Pacherie, 2013) and imbue thought with aberrant salience
that disrupts the inner continuity of experience as described
by the earlier phenomenologists (Gruhle, 1922, 1929, 1932).
Additionally, ‘‘concrete’’ misinterpretations of proverbs by
patients with schizophrenia may be explained as a failure to
integrate context information that usually guides their automatic
interpretation. Proverbs are instead interpreted ‘‘word-by-
word’’, that is, according to the literal meaning of the words
rather than in an abstract sense (Heinz, 2014). As indicated
above, the phenomenological psychiatrists Mayer-Gross and
later Binswanger, Blankenburg, Conrad and Matussek pointed
to a loss of context as fundamental to delusional-formation and
the self-disturbances on different levels of perceptual processing
(Mishara, 2011; Mishara and Fusar-Poli, 2013).
In terms of Bayesian predictive-coding, contextual
information for thoughts can be seen as constituting prior beliefs
as to which thoughts are likely to occur next. Moreover, we
expect thoughts to behave like thoughts and not like ‘‘perceptual
objects,’’ which seem to appear from nowhere. If the precision
of these prior beliefs is reduced and/or sensory precision is
increased, this will lead to an increase in the precision-weighted
prediction error evoked by the neural activity that encodes these
thoughts. Such poorly predicted thoughts will be experienced
as aberrantly salient, just as poorly predicted perceptions are,
and will evoke an experience of surprise. We propose that it is
the aberrant salience caused by increased precision-weighted
prediction error that is at the core of the ‘‘strange feeling’’
that patients report to be associated with inserted thoughts
(Vosgerau and Newen, 2007). Unlike Schröder’s ‘‘feeling of
foreignness,’’ which is stated as something ultimate, as not
further analyzable, or explainable, the ‘‘strange feeling’’ here is
neither ultimate nor final. The ‘‘feeling of foreignness’’ is, in
Mayer-Gross’ terms, a content rather than a mode of givenness
(Mayer-Gross and Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932) and thus in
itself not contributing to its experience as sensory, which, in our
view, rests on mechanisms modeled by predictive coding.
Importantly, when conceiving of thoughts as being predicted
by prior beliefs that are determined by context information,
we make no principled assumption as to whether this context
information is consciously accessible. In Bayesian inference,
a prior belief is considered merely a probability distribution
over some unknown state and may or may not be consciously
accessible (Adams et al., 2013; Mishara and Sterzer, 2015).
Importantly, current models of hierarchical predictive coding
assume that prior beliefs are fundamentally embodied even at
the lowest levels of sensory processing (Friston, 2005; Adams
et al., 2013). For instance, most of the above-mentioned
influences of context (both spatial and temporal) on visual
perception, which are prime examples of efficient predictive
coding (Clark, 2013), take effect automatically and are often
not accessible to conscious introspection. Similarly, context-
based prior beliefs about thoughts may be implemented
automatically without the individual’s awareness, similar to
the above-mentioned example of proverb interpretation. This
view is also supported by neuroimaging work suggesting neural
representations of upcoming decisions about mental operations
that can be decoded several seconds before an individual
becomes aware of the decision (Soon et al., 2008). It is thus
conceivable that prior beliefs about upcoming thoughts do have
a neural representation that is not necessarily accessible to
introspection. Yet, a reduced precision of such a representation
(also unconscious) may result in an increased precision-weighted
prediction error associated with neural activity underlying
a subsequent thought, thus imbuing the thought with the
qualities normally associated with sensations, and thus aberrant
salience. A first step in putting this idea to the test empirically
would be to assess the relationship between thought insertion
and altered sensory context processing. We would expect
that reduced precision in the signaling of predictive context
would be associated with an increased occurrence of thought
insertion. The direct empirical investigation of our hypothesis
that thought insertion is due to increased prediction-error
signaling associated with the neural events underlying thoughts
is an intriguing challenge for future research and will require
the development of new experimental paradigms. For example,
one could investigate the effects of conscious and unconscious
contextual information on the experience of one’s own thoughts
using the modulation of the predictive context by (supra-
and subliminal) priming. Furthermore, computational modeling
could be used to estimate the parameters for the precision of
predictions and for precision-weighted prediction errors, thus
linking thought insertion to the neural computations underlying
predictive coding (see Iglesias et al., 2013; Schmack et al.,
2016).
The view outlined here has important implications for the
question whether intentions to think play a role in thought
insertion (Akins and Dennett, 1986; Stephens and Graham,
2000; Heinz, 2014). The hierarchical predictive-coding account
of thought insertion has the potential to solve this problem as
it does not invoke intentions to think but relies on prior beliefs
about thoughts and how thoughts are supposed to behave, which
may or may not be consciously accessible. In a similar vein,
the view proposed here also has implications for the distinction
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between inserted and unbidden thoughts (Stephens and Graham,
2000; Gallagher, 2004; Vosgerau and Newen, 2007; Heinz, 2014;
Vosgerau and Voss, 2014). Both may be experienced as coming
from nowhere, meaning that in both cases the occurrence of a
particular thought at a particular time may be surprising to the
individual who in both cases may be unable to introspectively
explain the occurrence of the thought. Vosgerau and Voss (2014)
therefore distinguish control over thoughts (which is disturbed
in both, inserted and intrusive/unbidden thoughts, respectively)
from authorship of thoughts (which is disturbed in the case of
inserted thoughts only). The fact that only inserted thoughts
are attributed to an alien agent may be accounted for by the
aberrant salience of such thoughts. Again, the cause of aberrant
salience, low precision of prior beliefs and/or increased sensory
precision, may not be accessible to introspection, leaving the
strange feeling associated with inserted thoughts unintelligible to
the individual. While beliefs and desires can have a role in the
prior beliefs regarding our own thoughts (Stephens and Graham,
2000), what makes thoughts feel alien is not the result of a higher-
level introspection but rather the prediction-error based aberrant
salience caused by imprecise prior beliefs. It is therefore not
the failure of introspection in a comparator process (Campbell,
1999) but rather the failure (or imprecision) of prior beliefs
in a Bayesian inference process that is at the core of thought
insertion.
Aberrant Salience of Thoughts and Their
Attribution to an Alien Agent
We have now outlined how a thought that is poorly predicted
by prior beliefs can evoke aberrant salience in analogy with
sensory events that are associated with excessive precision-
weighted prediction error. The question remains whether this
aberrant salience is sufficient to explain why patients experience
such thoughts as inserted by an alien agent. Here we argue
that aberrant salience provides a sufficient explanation for the
experience of thought insertion. To do so, we first turn to
the question what it is that normally makes us experience
our thoughts as being generated by ourselves and belonging
to ourselves, which is often referred to as sense of authorship
or sense of ownership, respectively. It has been proposed
that thought insertion reflects a disrupted sense of ownership,
and as a consequence also a disturbed sense of authorship
(for discussion see Martin and Pacherie, 2013; Vosgerau and
Voss, 2014). One non-trivial problem with this idea is the
assumption that we have a pre-reflective self-awareness which
imbues each experience with a sense of ‘‘mineness’’. This
basic sense of mineness (also called ‘‘ipseity’’) supposedly
accompanies every experience and becomes the condition
of having any experience at all (e.g., Henry, 1973; Zahavi,
2005); for reviews see (Mishara, 2007, 2010a; Mishara et al.,
2014). However finding reflective (phenomenological) access
to the putative pre-reflective mineness poses considerable
methodological challenges. Moreover, these challenges of
accessing pre-reflective consciousness as a pure (irrelational)
‘‘passive self-affection’’ (Henry, 1973, 1989, 2003; Zahavi, 2005)
should give us pause from simply identifying this evasive, but
putatively all-pervasive quality with either consciousness or
interoception. The latter involves a perception action cycle,
i.e., an experienced content. Notably, ispeity cannot be the
content of a perception, including interoception, because this
would objectify it. Rather, ipseity is seen as the condition
for, and therefore, must ‘‘precede’’ any perception action cycle
for the latter to take place at all. This position, however,
neglects how rapidly and automatically such perception action
cycles may occur and any ‘‘access’’ to ipseity would be
comparatively ‘‘slower’’ because it would require a retrospective
reflection or verbal report (and thus unable to rule out so-
called observer or verbal overshadowing effects) (see Mishara,
2010a; Mishara et al., 2014)4. Moreover, as Vosgerau and
Voss (2014) point out, the content of an experienced thought
does not necessarily contain self-reference. It thus remains
moot whether the idea of pre-reflective self-awareness as a
pervasive feeling of mineness (so-called ipseity or pure ‘‘passive
self-affection’’) is what is disrupted in thought insertion.
Instead, based on the phenomenological accounts by the
early Heidelberg school (see above), we propose that it is
not that something is merely missing but rather something
added or different about the experience of thinking. The
description of thoughts as ‘‘becoming sensory’’ (Mayer-Gross)
in the interruption of context and inner connectedness of
experience (Gruhle, Beringer) does not indicate the absence
of a feeling of mineness, but rather an altered modality of
thoughts, now given as sensory objects, and thus, a disruption
of context.
Here, we therefore suggest that sense of authorship and
sense of ownership are not generated by some specialized
neural circuitry that produces an experience of ‘‘mineness’’ or a
‘‘feeling of authorship’’. Rather, they are a result of thoughts and
actions being predictable on the basis of the current contextual
information, as described above. That is, if a thought is predicted
by (conscious or unconscious) contextual information and thus
matches prior beliefs, we experience this thought as generated by
ourselves and ‘‘belonging’’ to us. This is also compatible with the
phenomenology of automatic processing of contextual meaning
(Gruhle, 1922, 1929; Mishara, 2007, 2011). This is normally the
case, that is, the ‘‘default’’ manner of thinking is that thoughts
are predictable. That is, there is an on-line predicting of the inner
continuity of one’s thoughts and experiences on different time
scales—some conscious, some not conscious—which serves as
the context for this default view concerning our thoughts. If the
precision of prior beliefs is abnormally low, and the posterior
belief is biased towards the precision of sensory evidence (as
the mode of givenness of the thoughts), however, the thoughts
may be associated with aberrant salience. As it does not occur
normally, such salience is an unusual and surprising event,
which requires some explanation. According to Vosgerau and
Newen (2007), this misattribution of thoughts to an alien agent
is actually ‘‘a healthy and normal rationalization’’. They suggest
4Nevertheless, the ‘‘ipseity’’ concept is a moving target because it has not
been fixed by one definition, nor completely operationalized - and perhaps, in
principle, cannot be operationalized—leading to adjustments of the concept
over time to fit in with other theories, or objections.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 October 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 502
Sterzer et al. Predictive Coding, Phenomenology and Thought Insertion
that if there is a conflict between beliefs and perceived states, this
conflict is removed by some form of rationalization; and that a
quite normal way of rationalizing is to misattribute the cause of
the perceived state. In the case of thought insertion, it is ‘‘some
kind of strange feeling about one’s own thoughts’’ that creates
the dissonance to be rationalized (Vosgerau and Newen, 2007).
In a way, this may be alike to the situation in which one’s own
thoughts are interrupted by the utterance of another person—it
is unexpected and hence to some degree surprising, and thus a
totally unexpected thought may appear to come from someone
else as the most likely explanation of its surprising character.
Here, Martin and Pacherie (2013) proposed that the
attribution of thoughts to an alien agent is the result of an attempt
to make sense of this strange experience of having a thought that
appears out of context. Thus, they suggest that the interpretation
of one’s own thoughts as being inserted by someone else is
an attempt to ‘‘recontextualize’’ thoughts that seem to come
out of nowhere. The recontextualization or rationalization of
thoughts as being inserted by an alien agent of course appears
bizarre, but as Martin and Pacherie (2013) put it, ‘‘extraordinary
events call for extraordinary explanations’’. In other words, the
strange experience that we suggest reflects prediction-error-
based aberrant salience of thoughts is an unusual event that
does not normally occur (as the default experience is that
thoughts are predictable and not given as interrupting sensory
experiences). Even if the interpretation that such thoughts are
inserted by an alien agent appears bizarre, it may in fact be
the most plausible explanation for thoughts that are associated
with aberrant salience. In addition, there may be a readiness
to attribute the cause of such thoughts to another agent on
the basis of delusional mood in prodromal period (prior to
fully formed self-disturbances) or, following conversion to full-
blown psychosis, and already established delusional beliefs
(see Conrad, 1958; Mishara, 2010b). If a propensity towards
bizarre explanations for one’s surprising experiences has already
developed, then the interpretation of surprising thoughts as
caused by another agent (which one would normally reject
as bizarre) may be more readily accepted. Alternatively, the
alien agency may be, as Mayer-Gross suggests, the thoughts are
not ascribed to alien agency, but are rather directly perceived
as alien (Mayer-Gross and Stein, 1928; Mayer-Gross, 1932).
Nevertheless, hierarchical predictive-coding is consistent with
both alternatives and provides a way to integrate them into one
account of thought insertion.
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